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Political fragmentation is the division of the political landscape into so many different parties and groups that the governance might become inefficient.[1] Political fragmentation can apply to political parties, political groups or other political organisations. It is most often operationalized using the effective number of parliamentary parties.[2]

Effects of political fragmentation

Scholars, journalists, and politicians have theorized about a number of potential effects of political fragmentation. For example, it has been argued that higher fragmentation allows voters to better represent their political spectrum of political positions. The length of government coalition formation has also been argued to increase with number of parties and decreases with preexisting political groups.[3] The strength of these effects has been hypothesized to depend on whether it is the government or the opposition that are fragmented.[4] However, the political fragmentation of parliaments has little causal effect on a number of dimensions of the quality of democracy.[5] The veto player theory predicts that higher fragmentation relates to gridlock,[6] but other literature does not observe increased gridlock.[7]

While one-party states are authoritarian, dominant-party systems can be democratic.[8]

Factors affecting level of political fragmentation

The political fragmentation, represented by effective number of parties, is roughly estimated with the seat product model,[9][10] and increases with district magnitude and assembly size. The political fragmentation tends to move towards an equilibrium, depending on the voting system.[11] Duverger's law predicts majoritarian elections with district magnitude of one favor a two-party system and proportional representation increases the number of parties. In proportional representation, higher electoral thresholds tend to reduce the number of parties since voters voting for smaller parties have a higher risk of having their votes wasted.[12]

Strong autocrats can prefer a fragmented political system, while weaker autocrats can prefer a low level of party fragmentation.[13]

References

  1. ^ Pildes 2022, p. 1, page numbers are per SSRN preprint.
  2. ^ "Election indices dataset, Gallagher, Michael, 2021".
  3. ^ Ecker, Alejandro; Meyer, Thomas M. (2020). "Coalition Bargaining Duration in Multiparty Democracies". British Journal of Political Science. 50: 261–280. doi:10.1017/S0007123417000539. S2CID 158378332.
  4. ^ Meka, Eltion (2022). "How much opposition? Political fragmentation and changes in democracy". Contemporary Politics. 28 (5): 517–538. doi:10.1080/13569775.2021.2015086. S2CID 245459910.
  5. ^ Valentim, Vicente; Dinas, Elias (2024). "Does Party-System Fragmentation Affect the Quality of Democracy?". British Journal of Political Science. 54: 152–178. doi:10.1017/S0007123423000157. S2CID 236793765.
  6. ^ Tsebelis, G. (15 September 2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press. ISBN 9780691099897.
  7. ^ McGann, Anthony J.; Latner, Michael (2013). "The Calculus of Consensus Democracy". Comparative Political Studies. 46 (7): 823–850. doi:10.1177/0010414012463883. S2CID 154367801.
  8. ^ Butler, Anthony (2009). "Considerations On The Erosion Of One-Party Dominance". Representation. 45 (2): 159–171. doi:10.1080/00344890902945681. ISSN 0034-4893.
  9. ^ Taagepera, Rein (2007). "Predicting Party Sizes". Oxford University Press
  10. ^ Li, Yuhui; Shugart, Matthew S. (2016). "The Seat Product Model of the effective number of parties: A case for applied political science". Electoral Studies. 41: 23–34. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2015.10.011.
  11. ^ Coleman, Stephen (1995). "Dynamics in the fragmentation of political party systems". Quality & Quantity. 29 (2): 141–155. doi:10.1007/BF01101895. S2CID 153425524.
  12. ^ Reuchamps, Min; Onclin, François; Caluwaerts, Didier; Baudewyns, Pierre (3 September 2014). "Raising the Threshold, Fighting Fragmentation? Mechanical and Psychological Effects of the Legal Electoral Threshold in Belgium". West European Politics. 37 (5): 1087–1107. doi:10.1080/01402382.2014.925736. ISSN 0140-2382.
  13. ^ Golosov, Grigorii V. (2 July 2020). "The five shades of grey: party systems and authoritarian institutions in post-Soviet Central Asian states". Central Asian Survey. 39 (3): 285–302. doi:10.1080/02634937.2018.1500442. ISSN 0263-4937.

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