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Bábism
Founder
The Báb
Prominent people
Letters of the Living Mullá Husayn Táhirih Quddús Bahá'u'lláh Subh-i-Azal
Key scripture
Qayyūm al-asmā Arabic Bayán Persian Bayán Kitabu'l-Asmá' Writings of the Báb
History
Shaykh Ahmad Shaykhism Conference of Badasht Battle of Fort Tabarsi Execution of the Báb
Resultant groups
Azali - Baháʼí Baháʼí–Azali split
Other topics
Teachings Calendar Pilgrimage
Category

An Azali (Persian: ازلی)^[1][2][3][4] or Azali Bábí^[5][6] is a follower of the monotheistic religion of the Báb who embraced the leadership of Subh-i-Azal. Early followers of the Báb were known as Bábís; however, in the 1860s with the Baháʼí–Azali split, the vast majority of Bábís followed Mirza Husayn ʻAli, known as Baháʼu'lláh, founder of the Baháʼí Faith, and became known as Baháʼís. Some among the remaining Bábís continued to follow Subh-i-Azal, Baháʼu'lláh's half-brother, whom the Báb had appointed his successor and leader of the community, and thus came to be called Azalis.^[2]

Azali Babis continued to push for the end of the Iranian absolute monarchy, and several individuals were among the national reformers of the constitutional revolution of 1905–1911.^[7] Azalis stagnated and disappeared as an organized community after the revolution, numbering at most a few thousand by the end of the 20th century, mainly in Iran.^[5][6][8] Azalis are considerably outnumbered by adherents of the Baháʼí Faith, who number in the millions.^[a]

Azalis do not accept any of those who have advanced claims to be the Báb's promised one (known as "He whom God shall make manifest"). The most bitterly contested claim is that of Baháʼu'lláh in 1863. Azalis rejected his claim of divinity as premature, arguing that the world must first accept the laws of the Báb before "He Whom God Shall Make Manifest" can appear.^[2]

With respect to the direction that Azali Bábism took immediately after the split, MacEoin said:

Azali Babism represents the conservative core of the original Babi movement, opposed to innovation and preaching a religion for a non-clerical gnostic elite rather than the masses. It also retains the original Babi antagonism to the Qajar state and a commitment to political activism, in distinction to the quietist stance of Baháism [sic]. Paradoxically, Azali conservatism in religious matters seems to have provided a matrix within which radical social and political ideas could be propounded.^[6]

After the split with the Baháʼís, some Azalis were very active in secular reform movements and the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905–1907), including Sheikh Ahmad Rouhi and Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani. However, the community was still suppressed as a heresy, and the accusation of being an Azali was often enough for most to believe it to be true. Coupled with the Azali practice of taqiyya (dissimulation), determining whether or not a particular figure in Persian politics was an Azali is difficult.^[6]

Taqiya ("dissimulation") was practiced by some Bábís. It was justified by some as a response to the often violent oppression the community faced. However, prominent Bábí leaders never encouraged individuals to practice it; and some who had practiced taqiyya later abandoned it, declared themselves openly, and were put to death.^[10]

Among Azalis, however, the practice became ingrained and widespread. One historian has noted:

The Azali Babis and in particular Mirza Aqa Khan Kirmani and Shaykh Ahmad Ruhi showed little hesitation in alteration and falsification of Babi teachings and history in their works. Azali Babis regarded taqiyyah as an imperative requirement.
In contrast the Azali Babis glorified taqiyyah in their literature. Taqiyyah was considered a virtue and classified into various levels of concealment. Prominent Azali leaders openly recanted their faith and even abused [the] Bab and Azal in the process.^[10]

There was some dispute on the question over who was Subh-i-Azal's appointed successor.^[11] MacEoin states that Subh-i-Azal appointed Yahya Dawlatabadi as his successor in turn after the death of his (Yahya's) father, Mirza Hadi Dawlatabadi.^[6] However, this was disputed by Subh-i-Azal's grandson, Jalal Azal, indicating that this question was not entirely resolved.^[12]

MacEoin notes that, in any event, neither he (Yahya Dawlatabadi) nor anyone else arose to organize the affairs of the community, or produce significant writing to develop the religion. He goes on to say (writing in 1999):

With the deaths of those Azalis who were active in the Constitutional period, Azali Babism entered a phase of stagnation from which it has never recovered. There is now no acknowledged leader nor, to the knowledge of the present writer, any central organization. Members tend to be secretive about their affiliation, converts are rare, and association appears to run along family lines. It is difficult to estimate current numbers, but these are unlikely to exceed one or two thousand, almost all of whom reside in Iran.^[6]

Despite their small numbers, the Azalis have included several prominent Iranian political and literary figures, notably Shaykh Ahmad Ruhi and Mirza Aqa Khan Kirmani.^[13]