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知識係信念嘅一種[註 2]:一般認為,如果某某人根本唔信 X 係真,好難說服人話佢「知道」X-即係話信念係知識嘅必要條件;但齋靠現實觀察已經可知,就算某個人話佢信 X 係真確,都有可能只係佢犯錯誤;例如家吓有座橋,阿明認為座橋係穩陣嘅並且試圖通過座橋;不幸嘅係,阿明過過吓橋,佢嘅重量就搞到條橋倒冧咗;觀察者可以話阿明相信條橋係穩陣嘅,但阿明錯咗,而一般認為,觀察者唔能夠話阿明知道條橋係穩陣嘅,因為條橋查實並唔穩陣-信念唔係知識嘅充分條件[16]。
阿 A 有理據信 X 呢句主張,若且唯若阿 A 信 X 而且佢手上嘅資訊令『X 係真確』嘅機率有返咁上下高。
又搵個例子說明,想像而家有人唔見咗個銀包,B 先生指控話係 C 先生偷咗個銀包(X)嘅,打後佢哋喺 C 先生間房嗰度搵返唔見咗嘅銀包(證據);一般認為,知道咗呢項證據令「係 C 先生偷咗個銀包嘅」呢句主張係真確嘅機率大幅噉提升[23]。而如果手上嘅證據加埋令到主張 X 係真確嘅機率相當高[註 5],噉班人就算係「有理據信 X 呢句主張」[22]。
除此之外,知識論思考者仲有諗到親身知識同聽講知識[英 13]嘅問題:想像家陣有樣事物,設樣事物做「廣東話」(不過樣事物係一個人、一笪地方、一嚿物件或者一樣活動都得);如果話阿 A 君「知道有關廣東話嘅嘢」,佢可能係親自聽過人(親自感知過)喺佢面前講廣東話,因而能夠用把口講得出廣東話有乜特徵,甚至實際講幾句簡單句子,噉嘅話佢就算係對廣東話有親身知識;不過另一方面,阿 A 君亦可以係根本從來未親自聽過人用廣東話講嘢,但佢喺互聯網度睇過啲談論廣東話嘅文,噉嘅話阿 A 君對廣東話就淨係具有聽講知識[34]。
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↑Socrates on Wisdom, Medium,原版嗰句英文譯句:"The only true wisdom is in knowing you know nothing."
文獻
英文文獻:
Annis, David (1978). "A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic Justification". American Philosophical Quarterly. 15: 213-219.