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Rasputitsa (from Russian: распу́тица [rɐsˈputʲɪtsə]; literally "season of bad roads"[1]) is the mud season that occurs in various rural areas of Eastern Europe,[2] when the rapid snowmelt or thawing of frozen ground combined with wet weather in spring, or heavy rains in autumn[1][3] lead to muddy conditions that make travel on unpaved roads problematic and even treacherous.[1][3]
Rasputitsa has repeatedly affected wars by causing military vehicles and artillery pieces to become mired in the mud. In conjunction with the general conditions of winter, rasputitsa has been credited with encumbering the military campaigns of Napoleonic France in 1812 and Nazi Germany during Operation Barbarossa, as well as all belligerents in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.[3]
The Russian term rasputitsa is derived from the root путь (put′), 'road, way, travel' + the prefix рас- (ras) 'discrepancy, divergence' + the diminutive suffix -иц (it͡s) + the feminine noun ending а (a).
The Ukrainian term бездоріжжя, bezdorizhzhia, 'roadlessness' () usually refers to spring, and occasionally to autumn, when rain and/or melting snow on unpaved roads, tracks, paths, or any poorly-drained off-road area turns the route into impassable deep mud.[4]
Swedish menföre 'bad going' and Finnish kelirikko 'broken state of roads' (lit. 'weather-break') also apply to when water is too iced over for boats but not strong enough to cross on foot or in other vehicles. Finnish eastern dialects also have the Russian loanword rospuutto (IPA: [ˈrospuːtːo]), which has the same usage as rasputitsa.[5]
In countries of the former Soviet Union, the concept is applied to two periods during the year – spring and autumn – and also refers to impassable road conditions during such a period,[6] specifically the heavy rains of October and the thaw of the frozen steppe in March.[7]
These conditions in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine are caused by high moisture storage capacity of black clay soils but not limited solely to the area of chernozem found in the region and works as a sponge.[clarification needed] Roads are subject to weight limitations and closures during the period in certain districts. The phenomenon was a notable hindrance in the early 20th century, since 40% of rural villages in the erstwhile Soviet Union were not served by paved roads.[6] The problem is less pronounced in elevated areas than in lowlands.
Roads that run through wetlands are particularly susceptible to damage. This phenomenon not only affects motorists but also pedestrians, mining, logging and agricultural companies creating deep ruts and furrows. During the time of rasputitsa, some farm products cannot be delivered to the city (i.e. to market) and must be destroyed.[8]
Autumn thawing occurs when the average daily air temperature drops to +5°C, which reduces the evaporation of moisture, and the frequency of rains saturating the upper soil layer increases.[9] In Canada there is definitely a rasputitsa period, though it does not occur everywhere or necessarily in the fall, and it is not considered a rasputitsa by name.[10]
Climate change in Russia and warmer winters in the Russian Arctic are a big disadvantage: Rasputitsa lasted previously for 2–3 weeks, and now it reaches two months.[11]
The rasputitsa seasons are well-known as a defensive advantage in wartime.[12][13] Spring thaw was a factor that helped prevent Novgorod from being overrun during the Mongol invasion of Kievan Rus' in the 13th century.[14] The 'season of bad roads' also proved to be a great hindrance in and after the Battle of Krasnoi, when many horses, carriages and cannon were stuck in the snow or mud and left behind during the French retreat from Russia.[12][13] Rasputitsa reduced the mobility of both armies but it seemed to be more favorable to the defender.
"General Mud" is a nickname (sometimes) used in the Western Front in the Battles of Ypres in December 1916.[17][18]
During World War II, the months-long muddy period slowed the German advance into the Soviet Union during the Operation Typhoon on the Eastern Front, and may have helped save Moscow from falling under a German military occupation.[19] The advent of Blitzkrieg had the disadvantage that while tanks could operate effectively in summer or in winter, they proved less useful in spring and autumn,[20] when the functioning of an efficient railway system came into its own.[21]
Prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, some analysts identified the logistical challenges of the mud season as a likely hindrance to any large-scale invasion in spring.[22] When Russia crossed the border, many of its mobile units found themselves stranded in fields and limited to major roads, where resistance and logistical issues significantly slowed the advance toward Kyiv and elsewhere.[23][24][25][26]
whilst it was almost impossible to drag the gun-carriages through the half-frozen mud(regarding November 20, 1812)
During the Mongol invasion of the Rus' principalities in 1238–1240, Novgorod escaped destruction by the Mongols due to an early spring, which transformed the routes to Novgorod into a muddy bog.
Both sides now struggled in the autumn mud. On October 6 [1941] the first snow had fallen, unusually early. It soon melted, turning the whole landscape into its habitual trackless state – the rasputitsa, literally the 'time without roads'.... It is commonplace to attribute the German failure to take Moscow to the sudden change in the weather. While it is certainly true that German progress slowed, it had already been slowing because of the fanatical resistance of Soviet forces and the problem of moving supplies over the long distances through occupied territory. The mud slowed the Soviet build-up also, and hampered the rapid deployment of men and machines.
By the time the Germans approached their major objectives such as Rostov, Moscow, or Leningrad the campaigning season was over and Barbarossa was off his horse. [...] [Hitler] had not planned to fight in Russia during the fall and winter. He had stated in his Directive No. 21 that this was to be a 'lightning campaign' to be won in two to four months maximum. [...] the cause of failure was the proposition that the Soviet Union could and would be defeated in a blitzkrieg.
While the Germans were to blame many factors, and particularly the rasputitsa, for the failure of Operation Taifun, the fact was that logistically the German attack on Moscow was in difficulty before it even began. German rail and road facilities were not sufficient to sustain the offensive beyond Smolensk [...].